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1. INTRODUCfTON 
At the edge of Panama City, on the Pacific side of the Panama 
Canal, the "Bridge of the Am.ericasu stands at the crossroads of the 
Anwricas. It was in Panama three decades ago that Latin America 
met a crossroads with respect to the resolution of international 
disputes through arbitration -a11d concluded the 1975 Inter­
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration 
("Panan1a Convention"). 1 
This Essay discusses how the legal framework of international 
commercial arbitration has evolved duri.ng the past three decades. 
It considers the role of the Panama Convention in  principle and in  
practice, the efficacy of the Panama Convention in light of  the 
ratification of the 1958 United Nahons Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New 
York Convention"):! across Latin America, and arbitral precedents 
in juTisdiclions across the region. 
· Jonathan C. Hamilton, Partner, White & Case LLP, Washington, D.C.; ChaiT, 
Institute for Transnational Arbitration (IT A) Americas Initiative. The author 
gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Michael Roche and Sabina Sacco in the 
preparation of this Essay, which is authored on the occasion of the thirtieth 
anniversary of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of lntenuztional Law. This 
Essay is based in part on a speech by the author on ''50 Anos de Ia Convenci6n de 
Nueva York: I mplicancias para America La tina," Seminario h<ternacional de Ia 
Nueva Ley de Arbitraje, Lima, Peru (2008). 
1 Organization of Ainerican States [OAS), Inter-American Convention on 
International ComJTtercia1 Arbitration, pmbl., Jan. 30, 1975, 1438 U.N.T.S. 245 
[hereinaiter Panama Convention]. 
2 United Nntions Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign 
Arbitral Awcwds, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New 
York Convention). 
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2. HISTORfCAL CONTEXT 
For the century prior to 1975, the prevailing perspective across 
the region was reflected in the so-called " Calvo D octrine . "  Bearing 
the name of an Argentine diplomat, the Calvo Doctrine hel d,  in 
short, that j urisdiction in international commercial disputes lies 
within the country in which the investment is located. The Calvo 
Doctrine generally reflected the reluctance toward arbitratio n  
across Latin America. 
In this context, Latin Arnerican states were slow to ratify the 
New York Convention. Only three states did so in its first twenty 
vears. In the area of investment arbitration, Latin American states 
J 
were even slower to ratify the 1966 Convention on the Se ttl ement 
of Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States ("ICSI D  
Convention" ) .J Only two d i d  s o  i n  its first twenty years .4 
Against this hi storical backdrop,5 the Organization of American 
States ("OAS" ) held its First Specialized Inter-An1erican 
Conference on Private International Law in the Republic of 
Panama in 1975. At the concl usion of the Conference, " desirous of 
concluding a convention on international commercial arbitration," 
the states of the OAS promulgated the Panama Convention.  
3 International Centre for Settlement o f  Investment Disputes [ICSID), 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States, March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
4 Jonathan C. Hamilton, Compendium of Latin American Arbitration Law, TNT'L 
DISPUTES Q. (Spring 2009). The first Latin American states to ratify the New York 
Convention were Ecuador in 1962, Mexico in 1971 and Chile in 1975. The first 
Latin American states to ratify the ICSID Convention were El Salvador in 1984 
and Ecuador in 1986. Id. 
s The meaning and implications of the Calvo Doctrine are not without 
nuance. See, e.g., Horacia Grigera Na6n, ICC Arbitration and Courts of Lmu: Practical 
Experiences in Latin America, in LAW OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: LIBER AMICORUM KARL BOCKSTIEGEL 231 (Robert 
Briner, et al. eds., 2000) (describing how the Calvo Doctrine impacts ICC 
arbitration); Horacia Grigera Na6n, Factors to Consider in Choosing an Efficient 
Arbitrator, in IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS: 
40 YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 286 (Albert Jan van den 
Berg ed., 1999) (explaining how the Calvo Doctrine can impact arbitrator 
selection); Horacia Grigera Na6n, Latin Anzerican Arbitration Culture and the ICC 
Arbitration System, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
OLD ISSUES & NEW TRENDS, 117 (S. Fromme! & B. Rider eds., 1999) (explaining 
further the effects of the Calvo Doctrine); see also Horacia A Grigera-Naon, Latin 
America: Overcoming Traditional Hostility Towards Arbitration, 477 INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 375 (1988); DONALD SHEA, THE 
CALVO CLAUSE (1955). 
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l'ha t enabled, to some exlent1 the evolutiona ry en1ergcnce of a 
new era in Latin American dispute resolution related to cross­
border cornrnerce and investment. Tn a 1978 article in the A111ericall 
{ournnl of lutcmational Law, one commentator SLllTlm<n·ized the state 
of affclirs as follows: 
c�Ivo invented his defense mechanism in an era when 
Latin America conceived itself to be lhreatened by the 
intrw�ive power and jnstinct of North A merica. But the 
Americas have ch.cmged . In the interdependent world of 
the last quarter of the 20th cenhuy, the Calvo doctrine is no 
longer either a necessary or a satisfactory prescription for 
the resoluti011 of foreign investment d isputes. So the 
industrial democracies and the institutions of the 
international economic system have tried a var.iety of 
devices to persuade Latin America to give up its Calvo­
induced isolation . . . . While Latins have held fast to 
Calvoism in the abstract, they have, in pructice, begun to 
show some willingness to di]ute principle with a dash of 
self-interest in cextain recent foreign investment cases.6 
The three decades since the Panan:.1.a Convention have been 
marked by c:�.n evolutionary expansion in the use of arbih·ation in 
Latin America, particularly beginn ing in the 1990s. 
3. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMIVIERCIAL ARBITRATION 
IN LATIN AMERfCA 
The lega l framework for international commercial arbitration 
was largely reconstructed from the ground up over the past three 
decades - treaty ratification by treaty ratification, law by Jaw, 
jurisdiction by jurisdiction. 
The Panama Convention signaled a step towards the 
acceptance of international comn1ercial arbitration in Latin 
America.. Negolialed over a series of years, it was envisioned as a 
regional agreement modeled after the New York Convention, 
although so few Latin American states had ratified that treaty. A 
prin"lary objective of the Panama Convention was to remedy 
perceived deficiencies in the internal arbitration laws of individual 
r, \tVilliam D. Rogers, Of Missi01111ries, Fanatics, and Lrrwyers: SOII/I? Thortg/1ts 011 
Jnuestme11l Disputes in the J\111ericas, 72 AM. J. [NT'!. L.1,3- 6 (1978), 
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Latin American states by establishing the requirements for valid 
mbitration agreements, the procedure for the recognition and 
en£orcement of arbitral awards, and olher n1atters related to 
arbitral procedure. The Panama Convention has now been ratified 
by a tot<� I of seventeen countrjes, including sixteen Latin Arnerican 
states and the United States.' 
The New York Convention has been rabfled by nineteen Latin 
An1erican states and a total of 144 countries worldwide. Overall, 
the ratification of the New York Convention among Latin 
American sta tes has followed pace with that of the Panama 
Convention- by 1995, for example, fifteen Latin American states 
had ralificd the Pana1na Convention while lhc Nevv York 
Convention had been adopted by thirteen states in the region. As 
discussed below, Brazil notably adopted the New York Convention 
only in 2002. 
Principally in the 1990s, many Latin American countries 
overhauled their don1estic arbitration laws to provide for the type 
of commercial arbitration contemplated in the Panan1a and New 
York Conventions. The changes i n  Latin American arbitration 
laws occurred as part of sweeping legal reforms and economic 
libera l1zation. Many Latin American states based their do1nestic 
arbitration laws in whole or in part on the Model Law on 
Commercial Arbitration forn1ulated by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL Model 
Law"). 
Some countries have even revised their domestic arbitration 
laws more than once. Peru/ for instance, enacted a new arbitration 
law in 1 996, an.d another new law in 2008. Indeed, Peru's 1996law 
was already a largely modern statute based on the 1985 
UNCITRAL Model Law. Nonetheless, Peru's n1ost recent 
arbitration statute entered into force on Septem.ber 1, 2008. In 
7 See OAS Foreign Trade Information System, Dispute Settlement: 
Commercial Arbitration, ·n1e Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration, http:/ jwww.sice.oas.org/ dispute/ comarb/ iacac 
/iacac2e.asp (listing the signatories). With respect to the negotiating history of 
the Panama Convention, see OAS, Proyecto Cmzvenci6n Interamen'cnna Sobre 
Atbitmje Comercial llzternncion.nl [Draft ConveJ1tion on International Arbitration], 
1\ctc!S y Documentos de Ia Conferencia £specializada Interamericnna Sabre Derecho 
lntemncional Privado (Minutes and Documents of the Inter-American Specialized 
Conference on PrivCite lnternacional Law l, vol. 2, OAS Doc. Ser.K/ XXI.l j CTDTP-
64, Jan. 15, 1975. 
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Latin American Commercial Arbitration 
Treaties and Laws 
EXCERPT OF TP.E COMPENDIUM OF LATIN AMERICAN ARSITR.ATION LAW 
���� 
;:::J ARGENTINA 
:Ed BOLIVIA 
f(Oa .. /I BRAZIL 
9;;J CHILE 
:-----) COLOMBIA � 
-
t.il5<lZllii\ COST A RICA ,_ 
:::DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
�ECUADOR 
� EL SALVADOR 
�GUATEMALA 
:::l HONDURAS 
FIB MEXICO 
......J NICARAGUA 
�PANAMA 
::C PARAGUAY 
HPERU 
�URUGUAY 
-VENEZUELA 
N�Yoc!< 
Convention 
E mry into loo:.� 
1989 
1995 
2002 
1975 
1979 
1988 
2002 
1962 
1998 
1984 
2001 
1971 
2003 
1985 
1998 
1988 
1983 
1995 
.,.;f.�:U 
P;)nama Arb tv ation l.awJJ 
Convenrion Amonrtments 
Entry lntc fo,ce iN� adctlf.tl 
1995 1967/81 
1999 1997 
1995 1996 
1976 2004 
1987 1989/91/96/98 
1978 1997 
NO 2008 
1991 199 7/2005/06 
1980 2002 
1986 1995 
1979 2000 
1978 1993 
NO 2005 
1976 1999/2006 
1977 2002 
1989 2008 
1977 1988 
1985 1998 
© 2000-09, Jonathan C. Hamiilon. This table may only be used with attnbution. 
particular, the 2008 law builds upon the experience of Peru and 
other nations in the held of arbitration, and also takes into accow:tt 
the 2006 amendntents to the UNCITRAL Model Law.s 
The evolution of the legal framework for international 
commercial arbitration in Latin America is set forth in the 
foregoing table, whjch is excerpted from the Compendium of Latin 
American Arbitration Law.9 The Compendium tracks the enactment of 
s See, e.g., Jonathan C. Han"lilton, lntcmatimwl Arbitrntion as a Component of 
Lnlin Anwricnn Reforms: The Case of Peru (1997) (on file with author). 
IJ This table is an excerpt of lhe Cmnpendium of Lnli11 A111ericnTL Arbitmtion Lnw. 
See sttpmnote 4. This is based on <Ill aualysis of diverse sources and may only be 
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the Panama artd New York Conventions throughout Latin 
Arncrica. The Co111pendium also notes the year in which each state 
adopted and/ or an1ended its domestic arbihation law. 
In addition to Lhe Panama and New York Conventions, smne 
Latin American states have also ratified other regional conventions 
and internalional agreernents. At a regiona I level, certain states 
have ratified the 1979 Inter-American Convention on 
ExtraterritoriC�l Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbilral Awards 
('Montevideo Convention"),10 while the member states of the 
Mercado ComCm del Sur (Southern Common l'VlaTket or 
"Mercosur") adopted the 1992 Las Lenas Protocol.1 1 The 
Montevideo Convention provides at Article 1 that it acts as a 
supplement lo the Panama Convention in that it applies "to 
arbitral awards in al! matters not covered by the [Panama 
Convention]." The Las Leiias Protocol, meanwhile, does not 
n1ention the Panmna or New York Conventions. 
A distinguishing characteristic of arbitration bas been the 
enforcement treaty framework- something lacking as to the 
enforcement of court judgments across borders. Recently, 
however, a Latin An1erican state (Mexico) was the first to ratify the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements ("Choice of 
Court Convention"). Mexico ratified the Convention in September 
2007, and it was signed by the United States in January 2009 and by 
the European Community in April 2009.12 The Choice of Court 
Convention aims to reassure contracting parties that when they 
agree upon an exclusive court to hear potential business djsputes 
arising between them, the judgments that result from such 
agreements wi11 be recognized and enforced intern.abonally. 
reproduced or h·anslated with credit This Essay focuses on Latin American 
commercial arbitration. For a survey of Latin American investment arbitration, 
see Jonathan C. Hamilton, A Decade of Latin AmericnJZ Jnvestme11L Arbitmtion, LATIN 
AMERICAN INVESTMENT TREI\ TY ARBITRATION: THE CONTROVERSIES AND CONFLICTS 69 
(Mary H. Mourra & Thomas E. Carbonneau eds., 2008) (discussing investment 
arbitration in Latin America). 
10 OAS, Inter-An1erican Convention on Extraletritorial Validity of Foreign 
Judgments and Arbitral Awards, May 14, J979, 1439 U.N.T.S. 87. 
1r Mercado Comun del Sur, Protocol on Jurisdictional Cooperation and 
Assist<'lnce in Civil, Commercial, Labor and Administrative Matters, June 27, 1992. 
l2 Hague Convention on Choice of the Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 
LL.M. 1294, nvnilnble nt http:/ jwww.hcch.nel/index_en.php?act 
=conventions.stattJs&cid=98#legend. 
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Previously, there was no overarchjng international treaty 
framework for recognition of court judgments that accomplishes 
this. Jnstead, states have traditionally enforced each other's 
judgments based on international comity and reciprocity. As a 
result, the enforceability of judgn1enl'S has been varied and 
uncertain, leading many parties to choose to arbitrate i nternational 
disputes rather than to take their chances with domestic courts. 
The Choice of Court Convention seeks to provide certainty as to 
the enforcement of l i tigation judgments by requiring contracting 
states to recognize and enforce judgn1ents given by chosen courts, 
absent certain exceptions and to the extent that the award does not 
compensate the injured party for more than actual dmnages.n The 
adoption of the Choice of Court Convention by additional Latin 
American sta tes may affect dispute resolution in the region. 
4. THE EFFfCACY OF THE PANAMA CONVENTION 
The Panama Convention shares many key provisions and the 
principal objective of protecting and promoting international 
arbitration with the New York Convention. There are key 
differences between the two conventions. Some of these 
differences relate to the scope of application and procedural  rules 
of the two conventions. Others relate to the obligation of courts to 
compel arbitration, and the requirements parties must follow to 
obtain the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. 
Another difference is the default rule established by Article 3 of the 
Panama Convention which provides that 11[1]n the absence of an 
express agreen1ent between the parties, the arbitration shall  be 
conduct�d in accordance with the RuJes of Procedure of the Inter­
American Cmmnercial Arbitration Commission (''IACAC11).14 This 
feature of the Panama Convention is discussed further below.1s 
Additionally, a number of issues addressed in  the New York 
Convention are absent from the Panama Convention. Unlike the 
New York Convention at Article t the Panama Convention does 
not specify the scope of its application- either with respect to the 
subject matter of the arbitration or the nationality of the parties. 
t:> Sec id. arts. 9, J1. 
�� See Panama Convention, supm note 1, art. 3. 
,., See i11jm Section 5. 
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The Pc:mama Convention also lacks the reciprocity provision set o u t  
a t  Article l(3) o f  the New York ConventLon enabling states to 
require that arbitral awards be made in the territory of another 
contracting slate.1<> In addition, the Panama Convention leaves 
open to broad construction the concept of when 21rbitration ·is 
considered ' ' international." 1t also does not require the courts of 
n1em.ber states to refer parties to arbitration after finding that the 
parties have c;igned a valid arbitration agreernenL Finally1 the 
Panama Convention does not contain formal requirements for 
obtaining the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral 
award similar to those set out at Article IV of the New York 
Convention -such as the filing of the original or a duly certified 
copy of the original award and original mbitration agreen1cnl, as 
weJJ as a certified translation if necessary. 
The relationship between the Panama Corwention and the New 
York Convention has been a SOLLrce of son1e friction as reflected in 
the comments of commentators such as Professor Albert Jan van 
den Berg, author of the seminal work on the Nevv York 
Convention.17 Two decades ago, he observed in a 1989 article that 
" [ t] he tradjtional hostility towards .. . international arbitration in 
Latin America appears to be on the wane,'' and queried whether 
the conventions are compatible and "can co-exist."1o After 
analyzing the differences between the two conventions, Professor 
van den Berg ultimately concluded that the answer to the 
compatibility question was " a  reserved yes.''19 He further 
submitted that "[i]n cases of concurrent applicability, n o  major 
conflict between both Conventions would seern to arise, except 
with respect to the applicability of the IACAC Rules. Sucb 
conflicts may be resolved by the rule of conflicts of treaties of 
maximum efficacy."20 
16 See New York Convention, supra note 2, a.rt. 1(3). 
17 ALBERT jAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958: TOWARDS A 
UNJFORM}UDlCIAL 1NTERPRETATION (1981). 
18 See Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Cmwention 1958 and Pmwmn 
Conve11tion 1975: RedtmdaHcy or Compatibility?, 5 ARB. INT'L 214, 214-15 (1989) 
(describing how full compatibility "raises the question what may be the raison 
d'el're of the Panama Convention in view of the New York Convention"). 
IY Jd. at 229. 
20 /d. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/19
2009] LATIN At\ITERICAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1107 
Observing how the Conventions have been interpreted and 
applied by arbitral h·ibunals and local courts, Professor van den 
Berg remarked on the New York Convention in 1999: ''(i]£ it ain't 
broke, don't fix it."21 Following a further decade o£ precedents, 
Professor van den Berg remarked in 2008 that the New York 
Convention "is i11 need of nwdernization" and tl1at many of its 
provisions need to be 'added', existing provisions are 'unclear', 
'outdated', and need to be 'revised.'"22 He has thus proposed a 
"Hypothetical Draft'' of an an1ended New York Convention (the 
"Draft Convention") designed to clarify, simplify an.d 1nodernize 
that convention.:n 
The Draft Convention is of particular interest in light of the 
distinctions between the Pane�m.a and New York Conventions. 
Among its principal aspects, the Draft Convention seeks to clarify 
the scope of application of the New York Convention set forth in 
Article I. As noted above, the Panama Convention Jacks such a 
characteristic. 
The Draft Convention proposes to abolish the reciprocity 
requirement found in Article 1(3) of the New York Convention, and 
si1nplifies the formal requirements for the recognition and 
enforcement o£ arbitral awards contained in Article lV. These are 
provisions which the Panama Convention did not have in the first 
instan.ce. Under Article 2(2)(b) of the Draft Convention, courts can 
refuse to compel arbitration if they determine there is prima facie 
no valid arbitration agreement under the law of the country where 
the award will be made. Additionally, Article 3(4) of the Draft 
Convention requires that courts act "expeditiously'' on a request 
for enforcement of an arbitral award. 
21 Sec Albett Jan van den Berg, Striving for Uniform littel'pl'etation, m 
ENFORCING ARBITRATION AWARDS UNDER THF. NF.W YORK CONVENTION 41, 42 
(United Nations ed., 1999). 
22 See Albert Jan van den Berg, The Draft Dublin Convention 2008-An 
Explanalion of the Proposed Changes prepared at the Plenary Session of the 
1nternational Council for Commercial Arbitration ("ICCA") Conference, 'n1e New 
York Ccmvention, at 50 (June 10, 2008), available at http:/ jwww.arbitration-icea.org 
/media/ 0/12133703697430/ explanatory _note_ajb_rev06. pdf. 
23 See Albert Jan van den Berg, Hypothetical Draft Convention on the 
International Eniorcement of Arbitration Agreements and Awards: Text of the 
Convention (May 29, 2008), rrvailnble at http:// www.arbitration-icca.org 
/media/0/12133A740979RO/hypothetical_draft_convP.ntion_ajbrev06.pd£ 
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Although it maintains the current grounds for refusing 
recognition and enforcement found in Article V of the New York 
Convention, the Draft Convention applies them only in "ntanifest 
cases" where the issue was also timely raised in the underlying 
arbitration. Moreover, the Draft Convention changes the public 
pol icy exception found in Article V(2)(b) of the New York 
Convention (also present in Article 5(2)(b) of the Panama 
Convention) to require a vjolation of "international public policy as 
prevailing in the country where enJorcen1ent is sought."24 
Finally, the Draft Convention clarifies COLlrts' discretion under 
New York Convention Article Vl to adjourn enforcement actions 
pending separate mu1ulment proceedings, as well as the parties' 
ability to seek enforcement of arbitral awards under other 
agreements or law as provided by New York Convention Article 
VIPS Although the Panama Convention contains a similar 
adjoununent provision at Article 6, it does not refer to recognition 
and enforcement under other agreements. 
Although directed specificaUy at perceived defects in  the New 
York Convention, the Draft Convention carries important 
implications for the Panama Convention as wel l .  The Draft 
Convention would in some ways narrow the gap between the two 
conventions by abolishing or simplifying provisions of the New 
York Convention that are not found jn the Panama Convention, 
such as the Article 1(3) reciprocity provision and the formal 
requirements of Article lV. 
At the same tline, because it also addresses issues contained in 
both agree1nents, the DTafl Convention could widen certain gaps 
between the two instruments, compounding issues of con1patibility 
and co-existence. Moreover, such considerations about the 
Panama Convention arise in a context of omens of the return of the 
Calvo Doctrine, particularly with respect to investment 
arbitration.26 
24 ld. 
25 Tn  particular, Article 7 of the Draft Convention provides that u[i]£ an 
arbitratjon agreement or arbitral award can be enforced on a legal basis other than 
this Convention in the country whe.re the agreement or award is invoked, a party 
seeking enforcentent is allowed to rely on such basis." hi. ar t, 7. 
1o With respect to the Panama Convention, see, e.g., Oaus von Wobeser, The 
lnfluence of the New York Convention in Latin A merica and on the lnte.r­
American Convention on International Commercii:1l Arbitration, 2 Drsr. RES. INT'L. 
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::>. ARBITRAL CONY EN flONS Ai\ID ARBITRAL PRACTICE 
A fundan1ental issue, m theory, is which oJ the rwo 
conventions a p plies in a given enforcement proceed ing. With 
respect to the i n terrelation between the Panan1a and New York 
Conventions, Article VII  of the ew York Convention provides 
Lhat: 
Th� prov tswns of the present Convention shall not affect 
the vnl idity of multilateral or bilateral agreements 
concc>rr1 ing the recognition and enfon:ernent uf srbitTal 
awards entered into by the Contracting States nor deprive 
any in terested party of any right he may have to avail 
himself of an arbitral award in the mzmncr and to the extent 
allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such 
award is sought to be relied u pon.J.7 
The Pamm1a Convention does not contain any such 
compatibility provision. For some1 this discrepancy suggests that 
the Pancuna Convention should apply in cases of conflict between 
the two conventionsr especially since the Panama Convention is the 
more focused regional instrument, and was also created after the 
New York Convention.2B In other contexts, the agreement that is 
most favorable to the recognition and en£orcement of the arbitral 
award is preferred .29 
43, 5�-55 (2008). With respect to the recent state of tJ1e Calvo Doctrine, see, e.g., 
Bernardo M. Cremades, The Resurgence of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin Amerka, 
7 Business Law lnternational 53 (2006); Horacio Crigera Na6n, Arbitration and 
Latin America: Progress and Setbacks, in Arbitration INSIGHTS; TWENTY YEARS OF 
THE ANNUAL LECTURE OF THE SCifOOL OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 393 (Julian 
D.M. Lew & Loukas A. Mistelis eds., 2007). See also Council of Americas Trade 
Advisory Group, Building /he Hemispheric Growth 1\gcnda: A New Framework for 
Policy, Council of Americas, at 6 (2009) (noting reduced "political desire" for 
additional trnde and investment treaties). 
�� New York Convention, supra note 2, art. Vll. 
2::! See, e.g., ]A03 KLEINHEISTTIRKAMP, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARI3fTRATION 
IN LA TIN AMERICA 27 (2005) ("There are good reasons in favor of the simple 
solution of the general rule of conflict of treaties lex specialis derogate gemrnli."). 
Specifically, because the New York Convention allows other agreements and 
addresses local problems, Kleinheisterkamp reasons "[i]f the arbitration is a 
genuine Inter-American one, the Panama Convention will prevail as lex specialis 
over the [New York] Convention." !d. 
19 See, e.g., infi·a Section 5.2. (discussing Peru's 2008 arbitration Jaw which 
follows this approach). 
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In most cases, the Panama cu1d New York Conventions n1ay 
provide for the same results i n  theory. Nonetheless, the cases 
outlined below demonstrate how the coexistence of two 
conventions arises in practice of the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign Mbitral awards. This issue is best cxarnined by a 
comparative Jaw survey, on a country-by-country basts. The 
survey below is a sample of certain laws and precedents. 
5. 1 .  Llnited States 
In tl1e United States, the question of vvhich convention governs the 
recognition and enforcement of arbi tra l a·wards is set forth in 
Section 305 of the Federal Arbi trc:� tion Act (the "FAA" ).3° Pursuant 
to Section 305: 
When the requiren1ents foT application of both the [Panama 
Convention] and the [New York Convention] are metr 
determ.ination as to which Convention appl ies shalt unless 
otherwise expressly agreed, be made as follows: (1) If  a 
majority of the parties to the arbitration agreen1ent are 
citizens of a State or States that have ratified or acceded to 
the [Panama Convention ] and are rTternber States of the 
Organization of American States, the [Panama Conven tion ] 
shall apply. (2) In all other cases the fNew York 
Convcntionj shall apply.31 
Section 305 represents an attempt by the Judiciary Conuni ttee of 
the U.S. House of Representatives to provide a uniform procedure 
for the application of the Panama and New York Conventions by 
establ ishing a clear h ierarchy. Courts in the United States have 
recognized the obl iga tions in1posed on them by Section 305 in 
respecting this h ierarchy .32 
30 See, e.g.J ]OHN P. BOWMAN, THE PANAMA CONVENTlON AND ITS 
lMPLEMENTATION UNDER 11-!E FEDERAL ARBITRATION Aa 81 n.239 (2002) . 
31 Federal Arbitration Act, 9. U.S. C. § 305 (2000). 
32 See, e.g"/ Banco d e  Seguros del Estado v. Mutual Marine Offices, Inc., 230 F. 
Supp. 2d 362, 367, n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), nffd 344 F.3d 255 (2d Ci.r. 2003) ("Where the 
requirements of both the lnter-American Convention and New York Convention 
are met, the Inter-American Convention governs if 'a majority of the parties to the 
arbitration agreement are citizens of a State or States that have ratified or acceded 
to the [nter-American Convention and are member States of the Organization of 
American States."'); Progressive Casualty Ins. v. C.A. Re<�seguradora Nacional de 
Venezuela, 802 F. SLtpp. 1069, 1074 (S.D.N.Y. 1 992), reu'd nn ather grounds, 991 F.2d 
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Such a hierarchy is notably absent frorn the arbitration statutes 
of rnany Lstin American countries. ln con lrast local courts 
throughout Latin America tend to deterrnine which convention 
appl ies. Indeed, even where the parties have themselves specified 
which convention should apply, one cornmentalor suggests that " it 
is . �  . not certain whether Latin American judges will accept the 
parties' explicit choice of preference for one Convention or the 
other- a choice which is permitted by the implementing U.S. 
lcgis1a tion."33 
5.2. Peru 
Anicle 74(1) of Peru 's 2008 arbitration law provides that 
forei gn arbitral awards shal l be recognized and enforced in  u v 
accordance with: (a) the New York Convention; (b) the Panama 
Convention; or (c) any other recognition and eniorcement treaties 
to which Peru is a party. With respect to potential d iscrepancies 
among these instruments, Ar ticle 74(?) of the new law iollows 
Article 128 of the 1996 law by attempting to enforce foreign arbitral 
awards to the maximun1 extent possib]e, providing that "except 
where the parties have agreed otherwise, the applicable treaty shall 
be that most favorable to the party who seeks the recognit ion and 
enforcernent of the foreign award.":�4 
Under Articles 76 and 77 of the new law, the recognition 
and enforcem_ent of foreign arbitral awards in PenL is designed as a 
two-step process where courts firsl recognize an award in  whole or 
in  part and then order its enforcement. Moreover, as with Article 
1 29 of the 1996 law, Article 75 of the new law closely follows the 
grounds for non-recognition contained in Article 36(1) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and Article 5 of the Panama and New 
York Conventions. 
Once agajn reflecting a pro-enforcement stance, Article 75 
of the new law applies: (1) when there is no applicable 
42 (2d Cir. 1993)) ("The Ne\·\1 York Convention and the Inter-American 
Convention both represent current legal and political thinking favoring 
arbitration as a means of alternative dispute resolution. fn § 305 Congress 
sensibly provided for choosing between the two conventions if both applied to a 
given contract"). 
:n KLElNHEISTERKA1vlP, supra note 28, at 28. 
34 All quotations from Latin American arbitration laws contained m this 
artirlP art=> (rP.e translations from the Spanish originaL 
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in ternational treaty; or (2) when there is an applicable international 
treaty but the Jaw itself is more favorable to the party seeking 
recognition of the foreign arbitral awarc-L  taking into account the 
prescription periods provided under Peru vian law. Sirnilarly -
and recognizing tha t Article Vl l  (1) of the New York Convention 
provides that it s.hall not affect the validity of other tTtul tilateral or 
bilateral agreernents entered into by contracting sta tes - Article 78 
of Peru's new arbitration la \1\' goes c1 stt.:p further than the 1996 law 
in specifically allowing parties to avail themselves of the legal 
rights most supportive of their arbitrt:� tion agreemen ts and arbitral 
11wards. 
5.3. Chile 
Although Chile was one of the first Latin American 
countries to ratify the New York Convention (in 1975), the 
country's legal regime for arbitration lagged for years behind those 
of other countries in  the region.35 In 2004, however, Chile enacted 
a new arbitration law (Law No. 19,971) which is substantially 
based on the UNCITRAL Model Law.Jo Chilean courts have held 
that the new law governs arbilTal procedure with respect to 
contracts executed prior to its enactmentY 
01ile' s arbitration law does not expressly regulate the 
relationship between the statute and the Panama and New York 
Conventions, nor does it specify a preference for either convention. 
As a result, Chilean courts themselves deteTmine which instrument 
prevails in the case of a discrepancy. Nonetheless, Chilean courts 
have demonstrated their overall respect for the arbitral process by, 
35 See, e.g., Carlos Eugenio Jorquiera & Karin Helmlinger, Chile, ill 
]NTERNAT!ONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMElUCA 89, 184 (Nigel Blackaby, David 
Lindsey & Alessandro Spinillo eds., 2002) ("fl]n order for Chile to develop as a 
possible centre for international arbih·ation it is critical for it to update its 
nineteenth centwy arbitration legislation . . . .  " ) . 
3b See, e.g., KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 28, at 8i Jonathan C. Hamilton et al., 
Clrilc; Cliifenn Appellate Court Rules Oil Applicability uflnlemnlional Arbitration Law, 
lNT'L DISP. Q. 19 (2007). 
li Jonathan C. Hamilton et al., Commercial Abritration in Latin America, 1 TNT'L 
Drsr. Q. 13, 19 (2007) (citing D' Arcy Ma:;ius Benton & Bowles inc. Ltda. v. Otero 
Lathrop Miguel, Recurso de f [echo, Rol No. 865-2000 (Corte de Apelaciones de 
Santiago, Primera Sala, May 26, 2006) (holding that Chile's 2004 arbitration law 
applies to d isputes arising fron1 contracts executed prior to its enactment). 
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among other things, confirming that the role o f  domestic courts i.J1 
international arbitration proceedings is l imited.3S 
In 2008, for instance, the Chilean Supreme Court rejected 
arguments raised in opposition to the recognition and enforcement 
of an arbitral award rendeJed. in Brazil, finding that the 
Respondent's arguments exceeded the scope of its review.39 To the 
contrary, " [t lhe Supreme Court staled thelt the sole purpose of the 
eniorcement proceeding was to verify the compliance of certain 
minimum requirements related to the respect of public policy, the 
vahd notifjcation. to the party against [whom] the award is 
invoked, the respect to the limits of j urisdiction and the definite 
character of the. decisions to be enforced." -l!J 
5.4. Mexico 
'Mexico's arbitration law, contained in Title IV, Book V of the 
country's Commercial Code, was enacted in 1 993 and largely 
tt'acks the UNC:fTRAL Model Law. Article 141.'1 of l·he  statute 
provides that the arbitration law governs ''except as provided in 
i.nternational treatieS.11 In this regard, the Panama and New York 
Conventions constitute "the Supreme Law of the State'' Ltnder 
Article 133 of the Mexican Constitution and - a s  such - arc above 
Federal legislation in Mexico.-n 
As in Chile, Mexico's arbitration law is silent as to the 
relationship between the statute and the Panama and New York 
Conventions, and also does not specify a preference for either 
convention. At the same tin1e, given that Mexico's arbitration law 
incorporates the main provisions of both agreements through its 
3S See, e.g., D'Arcy, Rol No. 865-2000 (Chile). 
J<l See Cristian Conejero Roos, Tile Netu York Conve11tio11 in Lati11 America� 
Lessons from Recent Court Decisio11s, GLOBAL ARBITRA rLOJ\i REv. (2009), available at 
http:j / www .globalaJ·bitrationreview.com/ handbooks/13/ sections/ 50/ chapters 
/499 (citing Gold . utrition Industria e Comercio v. laboratoria Garden House SA 
(Sept. 15, 2008)). 
40 Jd. 
ell See Oaus von Wobeser, Mexico, in }j\JTERNATIONAL ARBJTRATION IN LATIN 
AMERICA, supra note 35, at 155, 184 (recognizing that international treaties ratified 
by Mexico, including the Panama and New York Conventions, " are situated 
above Federal legislation in the country's legal hierarchy, and they bind both 
authorities and individuals") "These treaties are self-executing vvithoul fmther 
need for implementing legislation." ld. 
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adherence to the UN CITRAL l\!Iodel Law, Ivlexican cour ts rarelv 
.I 
d irectly apply the conventions themselves.  
Mexican courts have on occasion based their decisions to 
enforce foreign arbitral a-v ards on the conventions . I n  the case of 
Nordsol l  Corpora tion v .  Iu dustrias Cnmer SA de CV, for instance, a 
U .S. partyr sou ght recognition and enforcement in l\l[exico of an 
arbitral a\Vclrd rendered under AAA rules .42  A lthough 
enforcemen t was gra nted in the first instance, the Mexican party 
filed an amparo. Affirming the decision of the lower court, the 
Mexican Sixth Civil Court of the Firs t Circuit based its decision on 
both the Panama and New York Conventions.  I n  reaching i ts 
decision, the Court " held that the grounds u nder the New Y ork 
Convention were very restrictive and judges were not  allowed to 
review the meri ts of  the decision contained in the arbitral awar d . "  
5 .5 .  B rnzil  
In contrast to the foregoing examples, the d evelo pment of 
Brazilian law reflects the country's long-standing reticence towards 
international commercial arbitration. Brazil ratified the Panama 
Convention in 1995, but did not enact a domestic arbitration law 
favorable to in ternational commercial arbitration until the 
following year.43 Brazil's arbi tration law does not  m ention the 
Panama Convention, and is modeled on the Spanish arbitra tion 
law of 1988 and the UN CITRAL Model Law.44 A l though Brazil did 
not ratify the New York Convention until 2002, Articles 3 7, 38 and 
39 of its 1996 arbitration law closely mirror Articles IV(1) and V of 
the New York Conven tion with respect to the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.45 Still, Brazil's 1996 
n See Conejero Roos, suprn note 39 . 
.J3 See KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 28, at 8 ("Brazil's former arbitral regime, 
which had been contained in the Civil Code of 1 916 and then in part repeated and 
complemented by the Code of Civil Procedure of 1973 - especially as interpreted 
and applied by Brazilian scholars and courts - was one of the most notorious 
exan1ples of Latin American adversity against arbitration. Since the early 80s, 
there had been several incentives for modernizing this regime and it was only 
after fierce lobbying that the new law could be passed in 1996"). 
H Id. 
!S Sec Fabiano Robalinho Cavalcanti, E njo rce111ent  of Fo reign A rbitral Awa rds 
1 11 B razil, GLOBAL ARBITRATION REV. (2009), available a t  
l1tt p : /  / globalarbi trationreview.comj handbooks/ 13/ sections/ 51 / chapters/ 502/ b 
razil (" The legisl ature used the text of the New York Convention as the basis for 
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arbitration l a w  rernaincd subject to constitutional challenge u n l i l  
2001.�" 
Since the adoption of the New York Convention in 2002, Brazil 
has increasingly lT8nsforn1ed i tself into a jurisdiction favorable to 
intern8 tiona 1 arbitration. Between 1996 and 2004, act ions for the 
recognition cmd enforcement of foreign arbitral avvards in Brazil 
were heard by the Supremo Tribunal Federal ("STf"), while since 
2004 such cases have been heard by the Superior Tribunal de 
J usti�a ("ST]")."' During this tirne, the STF denied recogrti l'ion and 
enforcement in two out of five cases, vvhile the sro has denied 
recognition and enforcement in only four out of seventePJI cases.-�ll 
In both Tribunals, recognition and enforcement were dcni�d 
primarily on p.rocedura1 grounds, including: where the Brazilian 
party was improperly summoned (two cases), where there wc1s no 
vahd written arbjtration agreement (tlu-ee cases), and ·where the 
arbitral award had been assigned to a third party which lacked 
standing to seek recognition and enforcement (one case)_.FJ 
drafting [Articles 38 and 39 of the Brazilian arbitration law] which, in the end, 
basically provide that the homologation of fOl'eign arbitral «1wnrds rnav be denied 
in Brazil in the same circumstances as the ones provided in article V of the New 
York Convention."); Jonathan C Harnilton, et al., Brnzil: £11jorcenu.:nf 11- Arbitrnl 
Awards, lNT'L D!SP. Q., tWailable at http:/ /www.whitecase.com/idq/Fall-
2007 /cal/ (last visited Apr. 09, 2009). 
4& See M.B.V. Comm. v. Resil fndt:tstria e Comercio Ltda., S.T.F., Ap. No. 2149-
6, Relator: Ministrc Presidente, 05.08.1997, 102 S.T.F.J. 958 (Brazil) (upholding 
const itutionality o£ Brazil's 1 996 arbitration law). Seen/50 Crist ian Conejero Roos 
& Renato S. Grion, Arbitratio11 in Brazil: Lnw 1111d Practice frum tm lCC Perspective, 17 
ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL. 11, 13 (2006) ("Pm five years, the constitutionahty issue 
left doubts hanging over the future of the framework. which the 1996 Law sought 
to establish. However, in 2001, the Supreme Court rendered a majorily decision 
lMB V], in which the Lavv was held to be constitutional ."); Jonathan C. Hi.lrnilton, 
Brazilian Supreme Coul't Upltolds 1 996 Arl1i tm tion Law, 15 lNT'L DrsP. RESOL. 5. 5-6 
(2002). 
-t7 See, e.g., Kluwer Law International, J'[A Monthly Report (Eoger Alford ed., 
Apr. 2005), m.:iailable nt http:/ jwww.klt •wer;trbitrMion.romj::�rbitration 
/Newsletter.aspx?month=aprilmay2005 (recognizing that Constilu tiona I 
Amendrnent No. 45/2004, which entered into force on December 31, 2004, had the 
effect of transferring jwisdict io:n over the recogn ition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards from the STF to the STJ); Conejero Roos & Grion, supra no te 46, at 
14. 
·!8 Fernando Eduardo Serec & Antonio M. Barbuto Nctor Tfw New York 
Com>eJLtioll n11d the Enjorceme11t of Foreign ArbitTnl Awards, li'il''L L. OFFICE, 
Dec . 4, 2008, http:/ f \·vww .internationallawoffice.comj Newsletters/ detai l .aspx?g 
""2d2e3066-1 253-4966-b965-67a5b2bd3le7&rt>dir=1. 
+9 Trl 
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In addi tion, the STJ has demonstra ted at least  son1e will ingness 
to grant recognition and enforcement even where there exist 
procedural irregularities. For instance, in L 'A iglon 5/A v .  Textil 
Uniao 5/A,so the STJ granted the recogni tion and enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral  award even where the Brazilian p arty argued that 
the parties' arbitration a greement was not properly signed in 
a ccordance with Article 4 (1) of Brazil' s a rbitra tion law and Article 
II of the New York Convention.s1 In thi s  case, the STJ found that 
the Brazilia n  party had been aware of the defect and d i d  not raise it  
in the underlying a rbitra tion, and that therefore such a rgument 
had been waived .S2 Final Jy, not unlike Mexico, it has been noted 
that: 
There are a lready some precedents in which p a rties h ave 
filed oppositions to homologation requests r a1smg 
arguments rel a ted to the merits o f  the foreign arbitra l  
award and the Supreme Tribunal o f  Justice h a s  strongly 
rejected these oppositions, emphasizing tha t  the merits of a 
foreign award is not subject to review in homologation 
procedures. 53 
5 . 6 .  A rgentina 
Although Argentina is one of the more active jurisdictions for 
commercial arbitration in Latin America,  its domestic arbitration 
regime has changed little since the nineteenth century.54 Indeed, 
so L' Aiglon S.A. v. Textil Uniao S.A., S.T.F., Ap. No. 0031430-2, Relator: 
Sentenca Estrangeira Contestada, 18.05. 2005, 30 Y.B. Com. Arb. 426 (Brazil). 
51 See, e.g., Emilia Onyema, Formalities of the Enforcement Procedure (Articles III 
and IV, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
AEBITRAL AWARDS: THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN PRACTICE 597, 607 (Emmanuel 
Gaillard & Domenico di Pietro eds., 2008) (describing how the outcome of the 
arbitration turned on this factor). 
52 Id. 
53 Fabiano Robalinho Cavalcanti, E nforcement of Foreign A rbitral Awards in 
Brazil, ARB . REV. AMs. 2009, h ttp:/ /  globalarbitrationreview.com/ handbooks/31 
/ sections/ 51/ chapters/ 502. 
54 See, e.g. ,  Alessandro Spinillo & Emilio Vogelius, Argentina, in 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 35, at 22, 22-23 
(discussing " the urgent need to reform the national law on arbitration [in 
Argentina] which still dates from the nineteenth century" and proposing that 
adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law "would certainly enhance the legal 
security and predictability of the arbitral procedure, and help to create a new 
climate in which multinational corporations carrying out business in the region 
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various atten1pts to adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law in Argentina 
have so far been unsuccessfuJ.s;; Moreover, given that the country's 
arbitr8tion laws predate the ratification of the Panama and New 
York Conventions, Argen tina docs not have a sta tute that 
specifical ly regulates the procedures to be followed in cases 
involving the recognition and enforcemen t of foreign arbitral 
awards. 
In Argent i na, foreign arbitral awards m:e enforced under 
internatlonal treaties- such as the Panama and New York 
Convenbons- if applicable.56 A l though Argentine courts are 
bound by these agreements, there is no procedure for resolvi ng 
discrepancies between the two agreements if the parties 
themselves have not chosen a convention. In other cases, foreign 
'--
arbitTal awards are enforced under Argentina's National Code of 
Civil and C01nmercial Procedure.57 fn all cases, however, 
enforcement must be sought in the domestic court which would 
have resolved the dispute had it not been submitted to arbitration. 
6. PROMOTING AND PROTECrtNG AGREEMENTS TO ARB1TRATE 
As noted above, one unique feature o f  the Panama 
Convention vis-a-vis the New York Convention is the defau l t  rule 
established by Article 3. It provides that '' [i]n the absence of an 
express agreement between the parties, the arbitration shall be 
conducted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Inter­
American Commercial Arbitration Comrnission.11ss On this basis, 
au thors note that where there is an agreement to arbitrate but the 
absence of express agreement as to procedural m atters, the 
application of the IACAC Rules has bee.n considered mandatory.s9 
may become willing to accept international arbitration clauses providing fm 
arbitration in Argentina."). 
55 See KLEINJJEISTERKAMP, supra note 28, nt 6 (attributing the failure of the four 
attempts since 1990 to introduce the UNCITRAL-Model Law to the lack of interest 
in the House of Representatives). 
56 See Spinillo & Vogel ius, supm note 54, at 55-57 (providing an ovexview of 
the enforcement of foreign arbilral awards in Argentina). 
57 Id. 
:>s Panama Convention, suprn note 1, art. 3. 
59 See, e.g., Bow:-.·tAN, s11prn note 30, at 30-31; KLEINHEISTERKI\MP, suprn note 28, 
a t  28; Blackaby et al., Overview of Regional DevelopHH�Ilts, in lNTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA, supm note 35, at  1,  6 (recognizing that " [ the 
11\CAC rulesj benefit from a privileged status under the Pcmama Convention 
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Courts have recognized a n  obligation to apply the IACAC 
Rules .6° I n  A n derra Energy Corp .  v .  SAPET Dev. Corp . ,  the District 
Co urt for the Northern District of Texas gra nted the d efendants' 
rnotion to compel arbitra tion pursuant to the IACAC Rules . The 
Court arrived at this result by applyin g  Sec tion 303 (b) of the FAA, 
which provides that " [i ]n the event the agreement does not make 
provision for the place of arbi tration or the appoinhnen t  of 
arbitrators, the court shall direct that the arbitration shall b e  held i n  
accordance with Article 3 o f  the [Pa nama Convention] . " 61 I n  turn, 
Article 3 of the Panama Convention pro vides for arbitration 
ou rsuant to  the IACA C  Rules.  
L 
Thus, as noted by one comn1enta tor, the defau l t  rule  contained 
in Article 3 of the Panama Convention and of the IACAC Rules is  
relevant to arbitra tion practitioners advising o n  arbitration 
agreements b etween American parties: 
The incorporation by law, in the absence of an express 
agreement between the parties, of the IACAC Rules into an 
arbitration agreement subj ect to the Panama C o nvention 
makes i t  impera tive that the parties' negotiators and 
counsel are familiar with these rules . . . . [B]y not 
incorporating the rules of some other arbitral institution or 
not expressly negating the application of the IACAC Rules, 
the parties are effectively choosing, w hether they realize i t  
or n ot, the IACAC Rules to govern resolution of future 
disputes .62 
since it requires their automatic application to any arbitration agreement falling 
within the ambit of the Convention unless the parties agree otherwise" ). 
60 See, e.g., Anderra Energy Corp. v. SAPET Dev. Corp., 2 2  Y.B. Com. Arb. 
1 077, 1085 (N.D. Tex. 1 997) . 
61 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 303 (b) (2006). 
62 BOWMAN, supra note 30, at 30-31 (internal citations omitted). See also 
KLEINHEISTERKAlv!P, supra note 28, at 28 (stating that " [a]n important and very 
peculiar feature of the Panama-Convention which has been labeled [by Peter 
Schlosser and Philippe Fouchard] as ' the most inventive and daring innovation/ 
is Art. 3 . . .  [I]nventive, since its intention is the internationalization of arbitral 
proceedings to eliminate the fallback to municipal procedural law and, indeed, 
the often dreaded na tional judiciary . . .  Daring, because it orders the application 
of these norms as if they were regular law despite having been drafted by a 
private entity that is not governed by the contracting States") (internal citations 
omitted).  
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Since 2002, the l n ternational Centre for Dispute Hesolution 
("ICDR") of the American Arbitration Associabon ("A.A._/�\'') has 
had an agreement with lACAC to administer lACAC arbit rations.113 
TILis step was aimed at carrying out the vision of a regional legal 
framework for arbitration by providing default  procedural rules 
administered by an institution focused on arbitration for the 
Americas and thus reduce the need for jtld icial intervention and 
minimize uncertainty in Z�rbitral proceedings/'4 
7. CONCLUSION 
By way of sun1mary, three decades ago, Latin America lacked 
a comprehensive legal framework for the recognition and 
enforcement of internotional arbitral awards. Latin An1erican 
states have since brondly adopted the Panama and New York 
Conventions, and new arbitration Jaws. Latin American 
j urisprudence '"lith respect to internotional commercial arbitration 
continues to evolve. At the satne time, two thirds of Latin 
Americans still distrust their own judiciariesYi This portends 
continued evolution for commerc1al arbitration in Latin America in 
the decades ahead. 
63 See Luis M. Mcutinez, Are We Tltere Yet?, in ARBITRATION HEVIEW OF THE 
AMERICAS (2009). 
M See, e.g., Michael F. Hoellering, lllter-AIIlcricnn Conve11tion, NEW YORK LJ, 
Nov. 18, 1 986, at 1, 5 ("ln the absence of designation by the parties, Article 3 
provides that the arbitration rules of the IACAC shall apply. The practical effect 
of this provision should be to reduce the need for judici.al intervention in 
arbitration proceedings in the forum state and to minimize uncertainty and delay 
of such proceedings by reason of the parties' failure to regulate important aspects 
of the arbitration procedure in their agreements.") 
6i f11jonnt' LntinobarOI/Ictro 2007, CORPORAC!ON LATINOBAROMETRO (2007), 
http:/ jwww.latinobarometro.org/ (follow "OocLlmentos" hyperlink; then follow 
"Cuestionarios" hyperlink; then follovv "Cu.estionario :?.007"). 
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